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NO EXPRESSLY RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY: A RESPONSE
TO STEVEN D. SMITH
ANDREW KOPPELMAN*

The Supreme Court's religious freedom decisions are no thing of
beauty, and perhaps they will not be a joy forever. It has long been
fashionable in the academy to denounce them as a hopeless muddle.
Steven D. Smith is right: "Virtually no one is happy with the Supreme
Court's doctrines and decisions in this area or with its explanations of
those doctrines and decisions."'
Much of the law in this area, however, is well settled and uncontroversial. Some important rules are clear, have stayed stable over

time, and are likely to remain so. I list some of the most salient areas
of clarity and stability, with no claim to completeness.

First of all, "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. ' 2 There is today a hotly
contested question on the margins as to whether the state can directly
fund religious activity, so long as the principle that determines who
gets the funding is not itself religious.' But this marginal case should

not make us forget the clear core rule that government may not
support religion qua religion.4

* Professor of Law and Political Science and George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional
Law, 2002-03, Northwestern University. Thanks to Kim Yuracko for helpful comments on an
earlier draft, and especially to Steve Smith for the lively conversations from which this Paper
grew.
1. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, at v (1995).
2. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
3. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
4. There is the possibly embarrassing case of military and prison chaplains, but this
exception is limited to cases where government participation is necessary if religious exercise is
to be possible at all. Even in this context, denominational discrimination is prohibited. See
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Like many of the exceptions to these general rules, this
one is firmly confined to its facts. Any new attempt to put ministers, as such, on the public
payroll would certainly be invalidated by the courts.
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Second, government may not conduct religious exercises in the
public schools.5 Marginal questions remain here, too: When may
student-organized religious groups meet in public schools?6 Are
student-initiated prayers at school events permissible in some circumstances? 7 But, once more, the rule at the core is clear.
Third, religious tests for public office are prohibited. The Constitution bars such tests for federal offices, 8 and the prohibition has been
extended to the states. 9
Finally, to be constitutional, a law must "have a secular legislative purpose." 10 States may not bar the teaching of evolution in the
public schools; 1 they may not post the Ten Commandments in every
classroom.' 2 More generally, states may not defend laws on the basis
that they comply with the commandments of some religious source.
This doctrine is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of
other areas of constitutional law, notably the Fourteenth Amendment. Virtually every kind of discrimination that is "suspect" under
the Fourteenth Amendment has been defended on religious grounds.
If there were no secular purpose requirement, a state could invoke
divine will as a compelling justification for any discrimination that it
chose to practice. Consider, for example, Romer v. Evans, 3 in which
the Court invalidated a law that authorized any and all forms of
discrimination against gay people. Such discrimination could easily
have been defended on religious grounds. Absent a secular purpose
requirement, the Court would have had to choose between deferring
to the state's claims about divine law or investigating and adjudicating
those claims. The secular purpose doctrine spares the courts such
4
dilemmas.
Steven Smith's critique of modern religion doctrine claims that it
is incoherent, and he seems to imply that each of these rules should
5. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,587-99 (1992); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203,222-24 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424 (1962).
6. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
7. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
3.
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
9. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961).
10. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
11. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,103 (1968).
12. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980).
13. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
14. This argument about the importance of the secular purpose requirement is elaborated
in Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 155-65 (2002).
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therefore be abandoned. His specific target is one sentence in Justice
Jackson's opinion in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:15
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'1 6 This view,
Smith writes, "committed the Court (and the judges and lawyers and
scholars, and indeed the nation) to a course of massive collective
delusion."17 The idea that government cannot proclaim what is
orthodox, Smith argues, "is internally incoherent, practically untenable, and wholly inconsistent with the way government has operated,
does operate, and will continue to operate in this or any other country."18
Instead, Smith proposes a rule that does not restrict government

speech in any way, but only requires government to "refrain from
coercing professions of belief from unwilling citizens."1 9 This rule
would not be violated by any of the practices I just enumerated.

Government could, without coercing any profession of belief from
anyone, set up a church, pass laws that aid one religion, prefer one

religion over another, conduct religious exercises in the public
schools, and justify all manner of laws by reference to the teachings of
some religion. Religious tests for public office might be a harder case,
but even there, perhaps the state could say that no one is compelled
to hold public office. Smith's rule would thus revolutionize the law.20
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
16. Id. at 642.
17. Steven D. Smith, Barnene's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 625 (2003). He
similarly claims that Jackson's dictum has spawned "[large, labyrinthine discourses concerned
with freedom of speech and religion," id. at 626, and that "the 'no orthodoxy' position
memorably articulated in Barnette has had a beguiling but baneful influence on our First
Amendment discourses-and hence on our understanding of our community, and of ourselves."
Id. at 627.
18. Id. at 628.
19. Id. at 663.
20. Smith does not, of course, address all of the possible prohibitions created by the
Constitution. He does not even claim to offer a complete account of the Establishment Clause.
It is possible that the Constitution prohibits some of the practices I have just described, but on
some basis other than a prohibition of orthodoxy. On the other hand, it is not clear what this
basis would be. When he has offered a positive approach to religious liberty, he has argued that
courts should only intervene "where there is significant impairment of religious freedom in
some core sense." Steven D. Smith, UnprincipledReligious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 497, 505 (1996). Establishment Clause violations do not seem likely ever to reach this
threshold, see id. at 506-12, though some extreme cases may on his view be contrary to
American separationist traditions. See Steven D. Smith, Separationas a Tradition, 18 J.L. &
POL. 215 (2002). Moreover, even if there is some alternate source of constitutional law that
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Why does he think this would be a good idea? It is not clear
what problem this radical innovation is supposed to solve. Smith
never specifies just what the "baneful influence" of Barnette has been.
The proscription against any government promotion of orthodoxy on
any subject, he concedes, "has not been-and indeed could not beconsistently implemented." '2' It is, he correctly observes, impossible
for government to act in the world without implicitly prescribing what
is good and what is bad, and it is impossible for government to give
any reasons for its actions without declaring what is good and what is
bad. It would be destructive for government to try to avoid orthodoxy in these respects.
But if that is not the law, then what is? Jackson's dictum, to the
extent that it describes current law, has been limited in its scope in
two ways. It applies only to religion, and not to other possible objects
of official orthodoxy. And even with respect to religion, it only
prohibits action that explicitly endorses a religious view. In these
respects, the law is well settled. The clear cases, enumerated at the
beginning of this Comment, are neither "haphazard" 2 2 nor "law
professors' hypotheticals."2 3
These qualifications of Jackson's rule are, of course, among those
that Smith considers and rejects as incoherent. Yet, his arguments
against the workability of the religion/nonreligion and explicit/implicit distinctions depend on considering each of them in
isolation. If they are allowed to operate in combination, as they do in
contemporary law, the weaknesses that Smith complains of disappear.
Smith acknowledges the "common view" (which also happens to
be the present blackletter law) that the prohibition of official orthodoxy "applies with full force in the realm of religion, but that outside
the religious domain only the 'no coercion' prohibition applies. '24
The doctrine thus confined is still incoherent, Smith argues, because
"virtually every action taken by government at least tacitly teaches, if
not the truth, then the falsity of some religious beliefs."25 Thus, for
example, teaching Darwin in the public schools implicitly contradicts

restricts government's ability to declare religious truth, then all of Smith's objections will
probably arise again.
21. Smith, supra note 17, at 632.
22. Id. at 662.
23. Id. at 658.
24. Id. at 632.
25. Id. at 656.
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the views of biblical literalists and six-day creationists.2 6 Even the
laws against murder contradict the religious beliefs of the Aztecs.
Yet the law on the books is quite coherent, and it achieves this
coherence by placing considerable weight on the implicit/explicit
distinction. Government may teach Darwin without running afoul of
the First Amendment. But it is clear that the amendment would be
violated if a science teacher were to say, at the end of the lesson, that
"Darwin proves that God doesn't exist." The question of how
Darwin is to be integrated into a religious view is not one that the
schools are authorized to address. The Supreme Court has made
clear that government
may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion;
and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 2between
religion and
7
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.
There are, of course, nice questions on the margin about when a
given law crosses the implicit/explicit line. Laws prohibiting the
teaching of evolution, or requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every classroom in a state, are so obviously theologicallyloaded that the Court rightly judges that they go too far. But in the
evolution case, unless the science teacher starts denying God's
existence, the state is taking no particular religious line. A very wide
range of religious views are consistent with Darwin's theory.
Smith attacks the implicit/explicit distinction as well. Any government that really sought to avoid explicit orthodoxy, he argues,
would be barred from giving any reasons for anything it did.
Yet, if the restriction on orthodoxy is confined to explicitly religious propositions, then this objection collapses. Look how weak
Smith's indictment becomes once it is qualified by the appropriate
modifier:
[I]t is hard to imagine a world in which government manages to act
without explicitly affirming the [religious] beliefs on which it acts,
at least in many instances. And in any case, such an image is less a
26. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
27. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104. Smith is correct that many aspects of American practice run
the other way, but most of his examples are quite old. The "cultural heritage" exception to the
Establishment Clause is a substantial one, but it cannot allow the creation of any new instances.
See Koppelman, supra note 14, at 152-54. Moreover, Smith's attack on the public/private
distinction notwithstanding, things can be said in a president's inaugural address that cannot be
said in a statute. An officeholder making a speech can invoke God, but it is inappropriate and
unconstitutional for a legislature to do so in a statute.
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pleasant fantasy than a nightmare, because such a governmentone which acts and decides without articulating the [religious] reasons for its actions and decisions-would be contrary to the ideals
of openness and public rationality that have been so strenuously

cultivated during our history (in due process jurisprudence, for example, or in administrative law). 28

Of course, government should give reasons for what it does, but
it can easily do that without embedding its actions in any particular
religious narrative. It is possible to defend the law against murder
without saying anything at all about Aztec theology. Perhaps some
religious orthodoxy is in some sense implicit in the stop sign at an
intersection; at a minimum, it excludes the proposition that God
wants you to speed through the intersection without slowing down.
But there are many different theologies that can and do coincide in
rejecting this proposition. People with radically differing theological
views can have adequate reasons for obeying both laws. A secular
state is not a state that "stands for nothing. ' 29 But what it stands for is
not associated with any particular religious view.
So, the First Amendment's prohibition of "establishment of
religion" is, among other things, a restriction on government speech.
It means that the state may not declare articles of faith. The state
may not express an opinion about religious matters. It may not
encourage citizens to hold certain religious beliefs. 30 These are
perfectly coherent rules. They do not prevent government from
giving reasons for what it does.
Why would one want an anti-orthodoxy doctrine that is thus narrowly confined? It avoids incoherence, but what else can be said on
its behalf?

28. Smith, supra note 17, at 645.
29. Id. at 641.
30. The Court so held in United States v. Ballard,322 U.S. 78 (1944):
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.... The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied
and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and
of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a
charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting
views. Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the
right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious
views. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain.
Id. at 86-87 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871)).
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I have elsewhere noted that this cluster of rules can be understood to derive from the axiom that the state may not declare reli-

gious truth. That axiom is rooted in the underlying purposes of the
Establishment Clause. Three reasons are typically given for disestablishment of religion; all of them support the restriction on govern-

ment speech just described.
One classic reason for disestablishment is futility: religion is not
helped and may even be harmed by government support. Professor

John Garvey notes that this principle has roots in the theological idea
that "God's revelation is progressive," so that free inquiry will bring
us closer to God.31 The futility argument can also take the form of a
sociological claim that state sponsorship tends to diminish respect for
not know enough to
religion, 32 or a skeptical claim that the state does
33

justify preferring any particular religious view.
Second, there is an argument based on respect for individual

conscience. It states that the individual's search for religious truth is
hindered by state interference. This argument is probably parasitic

on the idea that the state is incompetent to promote religious truth,
but since that idea is powerful, the conscience argument is powerful

as well. Both arguments coincide in the conclusion that the state has
nothing useful to say about religion, and should therefore shut up.
Finally, there is civil peace. In a pluralistic society, we cannot
possibly agree on which religious propositions the state should
endorse. The argument for government agnosticism is that, unlike

government endorsement of any particular religious proposition, it is
not in principle impossible for everyone to agree to it.34 Under
31. John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 275, 285 (1996).

32. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948); 1 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 294-301 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans.,
1969) (1835).
33. John Locke provided the earliest example of this claim:
The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate
than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide who may
probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for
my salvation than I myself am.
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 32 (William Popple trans., Patrick
Romanell ed., Liberal Arts Press 1950) (1689). James Madison made the similar claim that the
idea "that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth" is "an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages." James Madison, A
Memorial and Remonstrance, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 64, 66
(Michael S. Ariens & Robert A. Destro eds., 1996).
34. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 322
(1996).
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conditions of deep religious pluralism, the only hope for common
ground is what John Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus"3 5 : a set of
political principles that can be supported by many different religious
and other comprehensive views, but that does not particularly depend
on any one of them.
This argument is distinct from the claim, ably refuted by Smith in
the past, that the Establishment Clause aims at preventing any citizen
from feeling alienated.3 6 That is an impossible aspiration. There will
indeed be some alienation, whatever we do. But it matters whether
the state officially declares some religions correct and some incorrect.
So long as it refrains from doing that, the question whether any
particular religious group is estranged from the state is one they will
have to answer for themselves. The state itself will not have barred
them from being reconciled with the established secular order. It has
not officially declared their religious beliefs to be false. It is different
if some people not only feel like outsiders, but are officially declared
to be outsiders, for example by a declaration of an official religion. In
religiously diverse societies, Charles Taylor has observed,
[b]oth the sense of mutual bonding and the crucial reference points
of the political debate that flow from it have to be accessible to citizens of different confessional allegiances, or of none. If the people
in this sense were to be confessionally defined, then non-members
would be excluded in fact from full participation in self-rule. Not
only would they be defined outside the bonded group, but their alternative outlook and perspectives would be by definition accorded

35. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
36. Smith is the most articulate critic of this as a criterion for Establishment Clause
violations, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987) [hereinafter Smith,
Symbols]; so it is surprising that in this article he takes alienation as the sine qua non of a
violation. See Smith, supra note 17, at 635, 640, 646-47, 652. Smith has noted that the focus on
endorsement in Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence is idiosyncratic, transforming the Establishment Clause from a prescription about institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right,
a right not to feel like an "outsider." Smith, Symbols, supra,at 300. Smith explains:
Under existing establishment doctrine, the evil to be prevented is improper governmental support for, or entanglement with, religion. Thus, the clause is primarily concerned with maintaining proper institutional relations. O'Connor's analysis, by
contrast, reconceives the purpose of the establishment clause as individual rather than
institutional. Her proposal aims to prevent... messages which make some citizens feel
like "outsiders" because of their nonadherence to particular religious beliefs.
Id. at 299-300. In recent years, Justice O'Connor appears to have forgotten that this political
alienation was the original concern of her endorsement test. She now makes that test turn on
the perceptions of a fictitious "objective observer," who is unfazed by state actions that may
intensely alienate many actual human beings. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 717-26 (2001). So it is not clear who now
relies exclusively on the anti-alienation rationale.
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a lesser legitimacy. They would not be full members of the sovereign.37

The condition Taylor describes is not a mere subjective feeling of
alienation. It is an official declaration of the second-class status of
nonbelievers."5 Smith argues that "what makes us persons-and the
particular persons we are-is not so much our 'interests' as our
central, constitutive beliefs, and that a community that neglects or
ignores this dimension of our personhood will have at best a weak
claim on our respect. '39 But if religious beliefs are unusually likely to
be central and constitutive for many persons, this provides a powerful
reason for doing what Smith says we must not do: "insisting that
among all of the families of contestable beliefs it is only religious
beliefs that are automatically and a priori disqualified from participating in a public orthodoxy."'4°
In light of our deep disagreement about religious matters and the
obvious fact that religion can and does thrive without state support,
there is no need for the state to declare any official religious line, and
there is danger in letting it try. Smith's rule against coercion, without
more, would leave the state free to do much too much.
It is true that the rules of law that prevail in the United States
have produced considerable alienation among some people. Smith
emphasizes that some conservative Christians have abandoned
American politics. 41 It has become clear that they will not be able to
declare America a Christian nation, restore prayer to the public
schools, criminalize abortion and homosexual sex, and discourage
women from working outside the home. But you can't please everybody. The prospects of civil peace are enhanced when people who
were vigorously lobbying to turn the country into an intolerant
theocracy give up and go home. Even these people's loyalty to the
community hardly seems to have been undermined. 42 Smith's attack
on the principle that government may not declare religious truth
37. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 46 (Rajeev
Bhargava ed., 1998).
38. On the moral seriousness of second-class citizenship, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 57-76 (1996); Andrew Koppelman, On the
Moral Foundationsof Legal Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REv. 777 (2001).
39. Smith, supra note 17, at 641. Taylor has argued for a similar view of personhood. See
Charles Taylor, What is Human Agency?, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND
LANGUAGE 15 (1985).

40. Smith, supra note 17, at 657.
41. Id. at 641-42.
42. As Smith suggests. Id. at 657.
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bears some resemblance to communitarian criticisms of liberalism,
which claim that the abstract egalitarian state is precisely one that
"stands for nothing" 43 and so cannot elicit the loyalties that less
deracinated communities call forth. But liberalism can produce
loyalties of its own. The vision of a community dedicated to respecting everyone's rights, abstracting away from their religious disagreements, has been a powerful one. 44 It seems to have some grip even on
Smith, who draws the line at coercing professions of belief from
unwilling citizens.45 I suspect that his reasons for drawing the line
there have something to do with considerations of futility, respect for
individual conscience, and civil peace. But then, he needs to explain
why those considerations do not also justify the settled rules he
attacks, which have served us well for a long time.

43. Id. at 641.
44. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 108-13 (1988).
45. Other critics have noted Smith's tendency inadvertently to rely on the very liberal
concepts that he officially repudiates. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 591-92 (1996).

